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 Abstract 
 
Changing Patterns of Corporate Disclosure in Continental Europe:  
the Example of Germany, by Theodor Baums 
 
This article presents a structural overview of corporate disclosure in Germany against the 
background of a rapidly evolving European market. Professor Baums first makes the 
theoretical case for mandatory disclosure and outlines the standard, regulatory elements of 
market transparency.  He then turns to German law and illustrates both how it attempts to 
meet the principle, theoretical demands of disclosure and how it should be improved.  The 
article also presents in some detail the actual channels of corporate disclosure used in 
Germany and the manner in which German law now fits into the overall development of the 
broader, European Community scheme, as well as the contemplated changes and 
improvements both at the national and the supranational level. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
A 2001 study by the European Corporate Governance Institute, entitled "The Control of 
Corporate Europe," shows that the control of most corporations in certain Continental European 
countries (including Austria, Belgium, Germany and Italy) is highly concentrated, with individual 
holders of share blocks ("blockholders") controlling more than 50  % of voting rights in many 
corporations.  This presents a strong contrast to the United Kingdom, where a majority of listed 
companies have no blockholder owning more than 10 % of the voting rights, and to the United 
States, where a majority of listed companies have no blockholder owning more than 6 % of the 
voting rights.
1 It is important to note, however, that in recent years both the structure of the capital 
markets in Continental Europe and the shareholding structures of the largest corporations in 
Continental Europe have undergone dramatic changes, changes that bring them in the direction of 
the U.K and U.S. markets.  At this time, the apparent reasons for these changes may be summarized 
as follows: 
 the privatisation of numerous state companies; 
 the globalisation of the demand for capital (dual and multiple listings) and the supply of 
capital (global investment strategies).  This tendency has been accelerated by the 
European Union's initiatives for creating a single capital market in Europe, as well as by 
the increasing harmonization of securities laws and accounting rules worldwide; 
 the need to significantly supplement state pension plans through private capital 
investment plans and asset accumulation; and 
 the appearance of a new status for investors through improved investor protection, 
developments in information and communication technologies, and the development of a 
services sector focusing on offering consumers capital investments. 
 
This article will focus on the transition of corporate disclosure and market transparency in 
Continental Europe, including changes that have already been implemented and those that still need 
to be brought about, using Germany as an example. 
 
II. The Case for Mandatory Disclosure 
 
To what extent must law mandate the disclosure of investor relevant information?  This 
question leads to the theory of regulation, which in its normative part deals with problems of market 
failure.
2  If a market failure arises because of externalities, asymmetric information, the dominant 
position of a market participant, or the production of "public goods", an appropriate state 
 2intervention in the market process can lead to an increase in social welfare.  A rule of law requiring 
disclosure would thus be advisable where the market for the information to be disclosed is 
characterized by market failures.  I will discuss this question in following, distinguishing between 
(1) an undiversified investor and (2) an investor who ascribes to the rules of portfolio theory, 
investing in a number of diverse companies. 
1.  The Undiversified Investor 
 
The traditional investor who contributes capital to a corporation in Continental Europe is an 
investor who places a substantial portion of his assets into a single company (as owner-
entrepreneur, member of a family business, or owner of a strategic holding in an affiliated 
undertaking).  Also in such cases, a legal requirement to make disclosure can be meaningful. 
Economic theory discusses a number of incentives for governing disclosure by private 
agreement
3 or by market mechanisms.  It is argued on the basis of agency theory that a contract to 
make a contribution to the equity capital of a company will be concluded (or be concluded at a 
reasonable price) only if the uncertainties the transaction presents can be reduced to a satisfactory 
level.  A rational investor will realize his informational disadvantage vis-á-vis management.  The 
investor will only be willing to make an investment if asymmetric information problems that 
disadvantage the investor are reduced to a satisfactory level before the contract is closed or if he is 
adequately paid for bearing the remaining risks, and the same applies to informational problems 
during the contract term. 
Even in the absence of legally required disclosure, a company's own interest would lead it to 
effect disclosure at the time of an emission.  When offering its securities to the public, an issuing 
company thus has an incentive voluntarily to commit itself to effect disclosure.
4  Thus, state 
regulation need not provide for disclosure as such, but, in the first instance, must protect against the 
release of misleading or deceptively incomplete information.  There is, however, a risk that a 
company will not respect its initial promise to disclose information at a later point in time, in 
particular, if the information could prejudice the interests of the management.  Since potential 
shareholders would see this risk at the time of considering an investment, they would demand 
adequate assurance of performance of the duty to disclose.  Such assurance could perhaps be 
provided by concluding an appropriate contract with the management, or by including a provision 
to this effect in the company's articles of association.  Further possibilities are present in the form of 
market controls. 
The  negotiation of a contract expressing the interests of the parties places burdens on 
investors that, as a rule, such investors will not be in a position to carry.  The bounded rationality of 
the contracting parties and the transaction costs, which increase in relation to the complexity of the 
 3contract, lead to a situation where only imperfect contracts will be concluded.
5  In the case of a 
public offering, a further problem is that numerous investors would have to be party to the contract.  
Moreover, in the case of a purchase of shares on the secondary market, the investor would not enter 
into a purchase contract with either the issuer or its management. 
If disclosure requirements were to be written into the articles of association, such provisions 
could later be removed by amendments to the same articles.  The ability to remove such provisions 
depends upon whether the majority shareholder who has privileged access to information holds 
enough voting rights to amend the articles of association.  An investing shareholder may be 
similarly disadvantaged if management controls the procedure through which shares are voted (i.e., 
the proxy system, as provided for in U.S. law, or voting by custodian banks in Germany).
6 
It also appears unlikely that adequate, voluntary disclosure will result from management's 
desire to maximize total economic return on shares; given the often conflicting interests of 
management, such desire does not always exist.  A market discipline mechanism (such as the 
market for corporate control, the market for executive management, or the market for the company's 
products) is also unlikely to provide investors with a guarantee that they will receive current, 
relevant and material information regarding the state of their investment.  All this supports the 
argument that disclosure policies should be enforced by a mandatory rule of law.  Such legal 
disclosure requirements can serve to reduce the risk premium demanded by investors and ease the 
acquisition of equity capital from investors. 
2.  The Diversified Investor 
 
As mentioned at the outset of this paper, equity holdings and investment behaviour in 
Continental Europe is gradually shifting towards the patterns found in the U.K. and U.S. markets.  
In large, publicly listed companies with widely dispersed ownership, individual investors no longer 
hold controlling blocks the way they did in the case of owner-managers or family businesses, but 
rather hold fractional interests.  In accordance with portfolio theory, such investors distribute their 
capital over the entire market.  A diversified investor himself can no longer collect and evaluate all 
investment relevant information on each company in his portfolio.  He thus turns to support from 
new players in the investment market: buy side analysts, asset managers, and intermediaries such as 
investment companies and pension funds.  These companies process investment-relevant 
information regarding the portfolio companies and, on the basis of their findings make 
recommendations to, or even investment decisions for, the investor.  This system certainly does not 
obviate the need to disclose material information to investors.  Rather, the addressee of the 
disclosure has changed from the investor himself to the buy side analyst. 
 4This division of labour points to another important theme for our discussion: disclosure 
requirements need not be tailored to the knowledge of every, average person. An annual financial 
statement for instance is meaningful only to a "financially literate" investor.  No more is required.
7 
In his article, Prof. Macey explains why, especially in a market characterized by diversified 
investors, it is necessary to compel disclosure of investment-relevant data.
8  An investment strategy 
that aims to minimize firm specific risk by spreading investment over a diversified portfolio does 
not eliminate the need to disclose company data: 
 if all companies seeking capital on a market refrained from disclosing relevant 
investment information on a regular basis, investors would either refuse to invest in the 
market or demand a high risk premium; 
 thus, at least some companies – even without regulatory disclosure requirements – 
would disclose the relevant information.  Other companies, by contrast, would attempt to 
hide risks.  As discussed above, it is difficult for "honest" companies to convince 
investors that they belong to the first rather than the second category. The all companies 
would be punished with a corresponding risk premium, which they would have to pay 
instead of increased disclosure costs (negative externalities); and 
 the "dishonest" companies would be able to benefit from the reputation of the "honest" 
companies up to a certain point; hence the market attributes equal risks to both. 
In general, there can thus be good reasons for a continuous disclosure of company data that is 
necessary for an investor to make a decision to buy or to hold.  To the extent that such information 
is not publicly accessible, the company must disclose it.  Even when the information is generally 
available to the public, albeit with a substantial expenditure of time and money, it is advisable to 
spare individual investors this cost, and to have the disclosing company gather the information once 
at a central source for distribution to investors – it is the "cheapest cost avoider".  Absent mandatory 
disclosure, investors will engage in duplicative and inefficient searches for information about public 
companies.  Requiring companies to disclose this information publicly eliminates duplication and 
inefficiency.
9 
The economic literature names another advantage of required disclosure that only arises if the 
legislator promulgates mandatory rules: the advantage of standardization.
10  Because an investor 
must compare a number of investment alternatives (a number of companies) before deciding on an 
investment, it is to the investor's advantage if the information that is relevant for the investment 
decision is presented in a standardized format that can be readily compared.  Standardized 
formatting saves investors time and money, and explains why listing prospectuses or annual reports 
should follow identical guidelines and schema in a standardized manner. 
 5 
III. Content and Principles of Disclosure 
 
1.  The Facilitating Function of Disclosure 
 
Corporate disclosure aims not only at investors, but also at creditors, employees, regulatory 
agencies, and the public at large.
11  As a rule, disclosure performs a facilitating function:  it is 
designed to facilitate, assist or enable the decision-making of the persons to whom it is addressed.  
This applies, in particular, to disclosure directed to persons making decisions whether to contribute 
capital, general investors, and existing shareholders, who are the primary addressees of the 
disclosure. 
 
2.  Primary Market (Ex Ante) Information 
 
An initial, important distinction is that between disclosure requirements designed to provide 
information to persons who subscribe to shares in an initial or secondary public offering (ex ante 
disclosure; primary market information) and the continuing disclosure requirement of listed 
companies (secondary market disclosure). 
As a general matter, ex ante disclosure seeks to give the investing public all material 
information regarding the financial condition and results of operations of the company, including 
the risks regarding such operations, that they require to make a reasoned investment decision.  The 
primary tool for disclosure in this regard is the securities prospectus, which is used in various forms 
both in connection with listing securities on an exchange (Börsenzulassungsprospekt) and for other 
public offerings of securities (Wertpapierverkaufsprospekt).  German laws on prospectuses 
incorporate the general European standards set forth in the relevant EC Directives. 
Following the steep decline of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange's Neuer Markt during late 2000 
and 2001, the Deutsche Börse AG investigated how it might improve primary market publicity even 
before adoption and implementation of the EC Prospectus Directive.
12  The Exchange has issued 
prospectus guidelines (“Going Public Principles”)
13 that exist parallel to the requirements of law 
and the exchange rules
14, and will be voluntarily adopted by issuers and their underwriters. The 
Exchange's recommendations aim at improving the quality of securities prospectuses, with a 
particular focus on the prospectus structure, the detail into which it is broken down, clarity of 
expression, presentation of risk factors and forward looking statements, disclosure of related party 
transactions, the use of pro forma financial statements for the issuer, and information on the 
experience of and any previous offences committed by members of the issuer's board of directors, 
as well as regarding the preparation and distribution of research reports by the underwriting 
 6syndicate.  Although certain aspects of the Going Public Principles have been debated, it is 
generally thought that its use could improve German capital markets practices and bring them in 
line with what are understood to be the best international practices. 
The ex ante disclosure of corporate information is, of course, not only important for initial 
public offerings ("IPOs") and secondary offerings.  Ex ante disclosure may also play a role in the 
much larger secondary market for securities, where a potential investor would not purchase shares 
from the company, but from a shareholder who desires to sell.  The information for the primary 
market thus mixes with the information that is continuously disclosed to the secondary market.  The 
nature of this information is addressed in detail in the following sections. 
 
3.  Secondary Market Disclosure 
 
An investor who has already subscribed shares in the context of an IPO or a secondary 
offering, or purchased them in the secondary market (shareholder) will be interested in information 
ex post in order to make a decision whether to hold or sell the securities.  I refer to this information 
as “ex post” or "hold/sell" information.  Similarly, the potential buyers in the secondary market will 
require similar information in order to make their decision on whether to buy.  I refer to this 
information, taken together with ex post or hold/sell information, as "secondary market 
information."  Secondary market information consists of a number of elements (discussed in section 
(3), below), and follows general principles that are similar to those underlying ex ante information 
(see section (4), below). 
 
(a) The Traditional Shareholder Information Model 
 
Traditionally, a shareholder of a stock corporation (Aktiengesellschaft) obtains the bulk of his 
information regarding the company's financial condition and results of operation from the annual 
shareholders' meeting.  For the following reasons, such information is inadequate for an investor in 
a publicly held corporation: 
 
 a shareholders' meeting takes place, as a rule, only once annually; 
 the information presented at the shareholders' meeting usually reaches investors too late; 
 the unconsolidated financial statements (Einzelabschluß) that are presented at the 
shareholders' meeting are, at least when prepared pursuant to German law, not designed 
to present a true and fair view of the company, but are designed to protect the interests of 
creditors and to serve taxation purposes; 
 7 management may only be required to provide additional information if an item or 
request regarding such information has been inserted in the meeting agenda (see § 131 
Aktiengesetz/Stock Corporation Act); 
 only shareholders, and not persons interested in investing through the secondary market, 
are admitted to the shareholders' meeting. 
 
Because of these defects in the shareholders' meeting as a source of information, regulatory 
requirements and developments in information and communication technology have led to an 
increased flow of information apart from the shareholders' meeting. Such information consists of a 
number of elements (see section (b), below), and serves two functions: first, to enable shareholders 
to make a decision regarding their investment on a continuing basis, including when a material 
change occurs in the company's situation, and second, to promote the development of an efficient 
secondary market, i.e., to facilitate the decisions of investors interested in acquiring shares that are 
publicly traded on the secondary market.
15 
Thus, at least in the case of a publicly listed stock corporation, the shareholders' meeting has 
failed to perform one of its traditional tasks: to provide market-relevant company information to the 
capital markets. 
 
(b) Information Disclosed 
 
Secondary market disclosure consists of a number of types of information, and has developed 
to meet market needs over the years.  This discussion will present only those types of information 
that are required to be disclosed by law.  However, it should be noted that information that is freely 
disclosed to the capital market is taking on increasing importance.  Such information has come to be 
disclosed in the context of investor relations and the pursuit of shareholder value, and includes 
voluntary interim reports
16, shareholder (news)letters, meetings with analysts and institutional 
investors, and postings on the company's website.  
 
(aa) Consolidated Financial Statements 
The German system for preparing consolidated financial statements has a long history.  Its 
original orientation was not capital market disclosure for purposes of investor protection.
17 Today, 
consolidated financial statements (Konzernabschlüsse) and consolidated management reports 
(Konzernlageberichte) are the primary sources of company information on the capital markets.  
They have substantially replaced unconsolidated financial statements (Einzelabschlüsse), which are 
oriented toward other purposes.  Pursuant to German law currently in force, which is based on the 
 8Seventh EC Company Law Directive,
18 the parent company of a corporate group must prepare 
consolidated financial statements if either the shareholders of the company itself or one of its 
subsidiaries is listed on a securities exchange.  At present, a company may choose to prepare its 
financial statements pursuant to either German accounting principles
19 or internationally recognized 
accounting principles (IAS or US GAAP).  As is well known, the European Council has recently 
adopted a Regulation on accounting that would require all capital market oriented companies with 
registered offices within the European Union to prepare their consolidated financial statements 
pursuant to IAS beginning in 2005 (with transition periods).
20 
 
(bb) Interim Reports 
The purpose of preparing interim reports is to provide recipients with regular, current, and 
reliable information on the financial condition and results of operations of the company, as well as 
its current outlook for the fiscal year. In principle, an interim report is understood as an independent 
accounting instrument that is designed to both present the developments since the last, annual 
financial statements and enable forecasts regarding the results for the current, fiscal year.  To this 
end, an interim report concentrates on activities, events and circumstances occurring within the 
interim period.  Publicly listed companies that prepare their financial statements pursuant to IAS or 
GAAP must prepare interim reports for the first, three quarters of every fiscal year. 
Under German law, the Exchange Act (Börsengesetz) requires the issuers of shares that are 
admitted to the official market (amtlicher Markt) to prepare at least one interim report during the 
fiscal year.
21  In addition, the Frankfurt Stock Exchange has required the preparation of quarterly 
reports as a condition for inclusion in a market index (such as DAX, MDAX or SMAX) or in the 
Neuer Markt (which operated from 1997 through 2002). In the future the securities exchanges will 
be authorized to require the preparation of additional interim reports (quarterly reports) for 
admission to premium segments of the official market.
22  The same applies to the second tier market 
(geregelter Markt).
23 In addition, these amendments of the Exchange Act by the Fourth Financial 
Markets Promotion Act will allow the securities exchanges to require a mandatory review of interim 
reports by independent auditors.  To date, such reviews are performed solely on a voluntary basis.
24 
The requirements regarding the preparation of interim reports as currently in force in 
Germany were originally based on the EC Periodic Reporting Directive (82/121/EEC), which has 
been replaced by Articles 70 to 77 and 102 to 107 of the EC Listing and Reporting Directive 
(2001/34/EC). The European Commission has launched a second round of open consultations for 
the purpose of updating the existing regulation of the information that publicly listed companies are 
required to disclose on a regular basis.  Recommendations regarding the preparation of interim 
reports belong in this context.
25 
 9 
(cc) Current Reports (Ad Hoc - Publicity) 
Periodic reporting requirements are supplemented by a duty promptly to file and publish 
current reports regarding events that are capable of significantly influencing the exchange price of 
an issuer's securities.
26  Current reports serve the needs of shareholders and the secondary market 
equally. 
The preparation of current reports in Germany may also be traced back to EC law 
requirements.
27  The European Commission's second round of consultations will cover specific 
questions in connection with current reports.
28 
 
(dd) Disclosure of Shareholdings 
The shareholdings disclosure requirement under German law
29 also arose through the 
implementation of EC law, the EC Transparency Directive.
30 Section 21 of the Securities Trading 
Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) provides that any person who through acquisition, disposal, or in 
another manner reaches, exceeds or falls below one of the thresholds of 5 %, 10 %, 25 %, 50 % or 
75  % of the voting rights of a listed company, must promptly provide written notice of such 
reaching, exceeding, or falling below the specified thresholds to the company and to the Federal 
Financial Services Supervisory Agency (Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht).  The 
company must publish this notice.  The European Commission is also considering amendments in 
this regard.
31 
 
(ee) Miscellaneous 
There are other types of information that are of value not only for shareholders, but also for 
investors contemplating a share purchase, and the disclosure of which is currently mandated – albeit 
imperfectly – by German law.  Improved disclosure should be considered for such information.  
This information includes transactions in the company's shares by members of the management 
board (Vorstand)
32, the structure of performance-based incentives for management board 
members
33, and transactions between management board members and the company
34, as well as 
situations that generally present conflicts of interest affecting the company.
35  In its consultation 
paper, the European Commission lists the following additional items of information that an issuer 
with exchange-traded securities should promptly disclose to the capital market
36: 
 
 any amendment to the instrument of incorporation or statutes.  The issuer planning such 
an amendment shall communicate a draft thereof to the home Member State competent 
authority and to the regulated market to which the security is admitted without delay, but 
 10at the latest on the date of calling the general meeting which is to vote thereupon, or is to 
be informed about; 
 any amendment to the rules applicable to the appointment, removal and the powers of 
personnel in managerial or supervisory bodies, including those for issuing securities; 
 any amendment to the rules applicable to the holders of special control rights, and 
representatives or proxies acting on behalf of such holders; 
 any amendment to the rules empowering a person, or body, to issue securities on behalf 
of the issuer; 
 any amendment to the rules applicable to the control system of any employee securities 
scheme, if its control is exercised on behalf of them, by another person; 
 any amendment to the rules applicable to shares, and rights to acquire shares, of 
personnel in managerial or supervisory posts of the issuer; 
 any changes in the rights attaching to the various classes of shares, including those 
related to convertible or exchangeable debentures, or debentures with warrants; 
 any changes in the rights of holders of debt securities resulting in particular from a 
change in loan terms or in interest rates; 
 new loan issues and in particular of any guarantee or security in respect thereof. 
 
4. General Principles of Disclosure 
 
There have been repeated attempts in economics literature to establish a body of "principles of 
orderly capital market information"
37, which would be designed to address information from both 
the primary and the secondary markets (see (2) and (3), above) in equal measure.  This attempt is 
also occasionally referred to in texts on the regulatory aspects of information to be disclosed on the 
capital markets. 
(a) Materiality 
 
Information has a facilitating function.  In the context of this part of the paper, information 
facilitates investment decisions, i.e., the decision to buy, hold or sell listed securities.  Information 
is "material" if it is capable of causing a reasonable investor
38 to take a different decision than he 
would have made in the absence of the information.  Both demonstrable facts and statements that 
are not capable of demonstration ("soft information"), such as management projections regarding 
business plans, can be material.
39  At least three policy considerations arise in connection with 
material information: 
 
 11 all material information, as defined above, should be disclosed in its entirety to the 
capital markets; 
 exceptions to this rule of disclosure should be strictly limited, such as for the protection 
of trade secrets; 
 immaterial information should not be disclosed to the capital markets.  Optimum 
disclosure, not maximum disclosure, is the goal.  Publication of immaterial information 
is not only expensive and unnecessary, but can even be counterproductive if it works to 
distract interested persons from material information. 
 
(b)  Clear Disclosure  
 
Article 22(1) of the EC Listing and Reporting Directive (2001/34/EC) requires that listing 
particulars present information in as easily analyzable and comprehensible a form as possible, and 
Article 5(2) of the proposed EC Prospectus Directive (COM (2001) 280 final) would reinforce this 
requirement ("The information . . . shall be presented in an easy analysable and comprehensible 
form").  This leads to the inference that a prospectus should refrain from using unnecessary 
financial and legal jargon. 
A similar position has been promoted by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission 
("SEC") through its "plain English rule" (see Rule 421(d) under the Securities Act of 1933, as 
amended),
40 which presents six, basic principles regarding the language used in prospectuses.
41 The 
Frankfurt Stock Exchange's Code of Best Practices also contains recommendations for the content, 
language and structure of securities prospectuses in order to achieve a clear presentation of relevant 
information to investors.
42 
Clear disclosure requirements can also demand that information that is not clear on its face be 
broken down into understandable elements, for example, to explain, rather than simply reiterate, 
data from the annual financial statements. 
(c) Current  Information 
 
Current reports and reports regarding changes in shareholdings
43 must be made "promptly" 
(unverzüglich), which under German law means without culpable delay.
44  Distinct rules exist for 
the disclosure of financial information: pursuant to German law, consolidated financial statements 
must be submitted to the shareholders' meeting within eight months after the end of the fiscal year,
45 
and be published within 12 months after the end of the fiscal year for which they are prepared.
46  
The German Corporate Governance Code, on the other hand, recommends that the period for 
 12publication be shorted to 90 days after the end of the fiscal year for which the financial statements 
are prepared, and for interim reports, it recommends a shorter term of 45 days.
47 
(d) Standardization 
 
One requirement of standardization is that all issuers must present the required information in 
the same format.  Like the prospectus, the balance sheet and income statement must follow a 
standard format, which reduces the costs incurred by interested persons in obtaining company 
data.
48  Standardization also presents another characteristic.  Because investors are interested in 
making comparisons between various companies, it could be advisable under certain circumstances 
to disclose a negative piece of information that would not reach the threshold of materiality if the 
company were viewed in isolation. 
(e)  Forward Looking Information and Cautionary Statements 
 
As a general matter, information in the capital market is forward looking.  It is necessary to 
put potential investors in a position to assess the results of the company's operations, including the 
company-specific risks involved, on the basis of the disclosed data.  If the occurrence of specific 
events is expected, but they have not yet occurred, this must be clearly stated.  Investors are also 
particularly interested in knowing how the management assesses the future earnings and risks of the 
company.  The provisions of German law governing prospectuses require an issuer to provide 
information on the future prospects of the company, at least for the current fiscal year.
49  In the 
context of secondary market disclosure, provisions of law require the management board to include 
statements regarding the expected future development of the relevant corporate group in its 
consolidated financial statements and consolidated management report.
50 A decision of the German 
Federal Supreme Civil Court requires that management show restraint in making future projections 
in prospectuses and that they disclose those factors which could mitigate against the projected 
future developments.
51  If we find this duty of restraint to be a concrete requirement, then the 
following may be said regarding forward looking statements: 
 
 the assumptions on which the forward looking statements are based must be disclosed; 
 the period of time to which the statements refer must be precisely stated; 
 factors that could mitigate against the appearance of the projected developments must be 
disclosed; and 
 cautionary language must make clear that the statements regard projections, not events 
that are likely to occur.
52 
 
 13(f)  Equal Treatment of Investors 
 
Legally required corporate disclosure creates equal treatment of investors with regard to the 
information disseminated pursuant to law, provided that appropriate media of dissemination are 
used.
53  If certain groups of persons are privileged in the disclosure of information, other groups 
will be prejudiced, and these latter groups will either withdraw from the market or demand a 
compensating risk premium on those markets where such activity is allowed.  Provisions on insider 
trading make it a criminal offense for members of the management board to communicate inside 
information to persons who enter into related securities transactions on the basis of such 
information.
54 
Supplementing these legal prohibitions, the German Corporate Governance Code provides 
that: "The company's treatment of all shareholders in respect of information shall be equal.  All new 
facts made known to financial analysts and similar addressees shall also be disclosed to the 
shareholders by the company without delay."
55 
 
5. Other Facilitating Rights and Shareholder Information 
 
Apart from their right to information relating to their hold/sell decision or, in other words, to 
the security's negotiability, shareholders have a complex bundle of other facilitating rights, such as 
the right to vote their shares. Shareholders do not have fixed claims against the firm, as do the firm's 
creditors and employees, but are rather residual claimants to the firm's income, and thus 
shareholders have appropriate incentives (collective choice problems aside) to make discretionary 
decisions.
56  In order to exercise their facilitating rights in an appropriate way, shareholders again 
need information.  The information relating to the hold/sell decision, as discussed above, is not 
sufficient to this end.  German law contains three principal concepts that are designed to provide 
shareholders with the information they need to exercise their ancillary rights.
57 
•  First, shareholders have broad, general rights to obtain information regarding the items on the 
shareholders' meeting agenda (§ 131 Aktiengesetz/Stock Corporation Act).  If requested information 
is not provided, a court may order that the information be disclosed (§ 132 Aktiengesetz/Stock 
Corporation Act).  In addition, a shareholders' resolution that is adopted on the basis of incomplete 
information may be challenged in court (§ 243 Aktiengesetz/Stock Corporation Act). However, in 
contrast to many other jurisdictions, shareholders in a German stock corporation have no general 
right to inspect the company's books. 
 14•   Second, if management plans to subject the company to significant structural changes of the type 
that require shareholder approval, German law requires that management submit a report to the 
shareholders in advance.  Examples of transactions requiring such a report are a capital increase 
without pre-emptive rights (§  186(3) Aktiengesetz/Stock Corporation Act), the conclusion of a 
contract forming a corporate group (Konzernvertrag) (§ 293a Aktiengesetz/Stock Corporation Act), 
a freeze-out (§ 327e Aktiengesetz/Stock Corporation Act) or a merger (§  8 
Umwandlungsgesetz/Transformation Act). 
•  T h i r d , shareholders may demand that any type of information be disclosed – even if such 
information does not relate to the adoption of a shareholders' resolution – if the shareholders' 
meeting so resolves or if there is evidence of dishonesty or of a serious violation of the law or the 
articles of association (special audit rights, inquiry rights, see §§ 142 et seq. Aktiengesetz/Stock 
Corporation Act). 
 
IV. Channels of Disclosure 
 
Modern information technology permits market relevant data to be collected at a central 
location and disseminated on a real time basis.  The German system of capital market information 
appears poised to make use of this modern technology.  Previously, information provided by 
companies was collected in disparate locations, to a significant extent in paper form only, and 
although electronically collected data is now increasingly available, it still cannot be called up or 
searched from one central location.
58 
1.  The Commercial Register 
 
General information regarding companies, including information regarding their registered 
offices, the members of their management boards, and their articles of association are recorded in 
the Commercial Register (Handelsregister) (see §§ 8 et seq. Handelsgesetzbuch/Commercial Code).  
Although the Commercial Register, which is administered by the local courts, could be kept on 
electronic medium, many have not yet converted to such medium.  It is also in most cases not 
possible to access Commercial Register data through electronic medium. 
2.  The Official Gazette 
 
The unconsolidated and consolidated financial statements of publicly listed companies are 
published in the Official Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) (see §  325 Handelsgesetzbuch/Commercial 
Code), as are the convening notices and agendas of the annual shareholders' meeting (§ 121(3) 
 15Aktiengesetz/Stock Corporation Act).  The law has traditionally required publication in print, but 
this has recently been changed, so that in the future, company notices will appear in an electronic 
version
59 of the Bundesanzeiger.
60  However, this change does not yet apply to the publication of 
annual financial statements.
61 
3.  Current Reports (Ad hoc - Publicity) and Disclosure of Shareholdings 
 
In Germany, the Federal Financial Services Supervisory Agency supervises compliance with 
the duty to provide current reports and disclosures of changes in shareholdings.  This information 
can be obtained in electronic form at any time.
62 
4.  Prospectuses and Interim Reports 
 
(a) Prospectuses 
 
Securities prospectuses (Verkaufsprospekte), in the case of public offerings of securities, and 
listing particulars (Börsenzulassungsprospekte), in the case of admission of securities to exchange 
trading, must be published in exchange-designated newspapers (Börsenpflichtblätter) with trans-
regional distribution,
63 and made available to the public either at the Federal Financial Services 
Supervisory Agency or a securities exchange.
64  It should be noted that Article 14 of the current 
proposal for an EC Prospectus Directive would allow an issuer or offeror to publish a prospectus in 
a number of ways: by inserting it in a qualifying newspaper, publishing it in brochure form and 
making it available free of charge, or posting it in electronic form on the website of the issuer and, 
if applicable, the underwriters, plus having it posted in electronic form on the website of the 
competent supervisory authority.
65 
(b) Interim  Reports 
 
Interim reports, to the extent that they are required,
66 are to be published in a similar manner 
as prospectuses. They are inserted either in the Official Gazette (Bundesanzeiger) or exchange-
designated newspapers, or published by the company itself in brochure form (with, as a rule, 
permission being given to use a website posting instead).
67 
5.  Plans for Reform 
 
The overview presented above highlights the deficiencies of the forms and manner of 
disclosure currently used in Germany: a fragmented collection of records and an over-dependence 
on paper records.  Many companies have reacted to these deficiencies by posting the information to 
be disclosed on their own websites in a timely manner.  The German Corporate Governance Code 
 16also recommends that companies undertake such action.
68  Supplemental posting of information on 
company websites is certainly a welcome improvement, but it is still insufficient because: 
 
 the information is not subjected to regulatory supervision with respect to its content and 
timeliness;  
 the information is not completely secured against alteration; and 
 publication on a great number of websites, as opposed to central collection of data, 
increases the costs that investors incur in searching for and obtaining information.  
 
Finally, it should be noted that a significant number of private investors do not have direct 
access to the internet, so that policymakers must consider whether – as in the past – certain 
fundamental information, such as convening notices and agendas for shareholders' meetings, should 
be provided to shareholders in paper form. 
The Commission on Corporate Governance that the German government established in 2000 
included detailed recommendations in its Final Report regarding advisable improvements in the 
form in which corporate disclosures in Germany are made to the capital markets.
69  It was 
recommended that a central internet portal, a "German Business Register", be established with links 
to individual data banks.  All required disclosures to the capital markets should be collectively 
available through such a central portal.  In addition, as mentioned above, certain basic information 
would still be made available in paper form.  The German government has resolved to implement 
this recommendation in due time. 
At the European level, there are plans to create a centralized European Company Register,
70 
and to modernize corporate disclosure made to the capital markets gradually in several steps.
71 
 
V. Sanctions 
 
A complete overview of sanctions would have to examine market sanctions (such as loss of 
reputation and impact on stock price), government imposed sanctions (such as fines and 
administrative sanctions) and other mechanisms (such as audits of consolidated financial statements 
by independent auditors,
72 or judicial actions filed by investors under securities law), and ask 
whether the "principles of disclosure" presented in section III. 4, above, are sufficiently policed by 
the available sanctions.  The discussion that follows restricts itself to a brief review of civil liability 
for the disclosure of false information to the capital markets under the law currently in force and a 
summary of certain plans for reforming this law. 
 17With respect to liability in connection with false or misleading primary market disclosure 
(civil liability for securities prospectuses), the European Community has not provided rules in the 
two Directives applicable to this area.
73  The proposed Prospectus Directive limits itself to 
instructing the Member States to impose civil liability on the responsible persons.
74  German law 
contains provisions on civil liability, and these have been amended in recent years.
75  F u r t he r  
proposals for reform are currently being discussed.
76 
With respect to false or misleading secondary market disclosure, however, liability exists 
under German law only if it can be proven that the defendant company damaged the plaintiff 
investor through a willful or morally culpable act or violated prohibitions of criminal law (e.g., 
criminal fraud).  The German legislator has responded to criticism of this state of affairs and has 
proposed legislation to impose liability on issuers who make current reports that – through a willful 
act or gross negligence – contain false information or that are published in an untimely manner.  
However, this proposal does not contain provisions imposing personal liability on board members. 
The Report of the Government's Commission on Corporate Governance, by contrast, 
recommends that board members generally be held liable to damaged investors if such board 
members intentionally or through gross negligence disclose false information to the capital markets; 
in the case of gross negligence, it is recommended that the liability be capped.  The 
recommendation includes use of a general representative for the damaged investors, but not of a 
shareholders' derivative suit à l'américaine.
77  The report prepared for this year's national meeting 
of German lawyers supports both approaches, liability of both the company and its board 
members.
78  We can thus look forward to more legislative action in this area. 
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